Why Social Democracy Matters
W. E. Smith, Editor, The Social Democrat
The election of Donald Trump to the presidency last year both stunned and appalled those on the left of America’s political spectrum. Perhaps even more dismaying, along with Republican control of Congress, is the fact that 25 states are now under total Republican control (governor and both legislative houses) as against only five for Democrats.
The American left, such as it is—poorly defined, without a rigorous theoretical framework for government—is at its lowest ebb in many decades. This in spite of the fact that its opponents on the right have grown more, not less, reactionary over the same period.
We are told from some quarters not to worry, that the victory of the left (as represented by the Democratic Party) is inevitable, that demographic change will overtake the (electoral) majority of conservative, older whites who have disproportionately selected Donald Trump, Congress’s current majorities and state governments throughout the country. This thesis, unfortunately, is problematic from many angles. The first is time: even were we to grant the thesis’s (unproven) validity, how long are we to wait for this promised demographic shift to become operational, while the nation suffers under either reactionary regimes or paralyzed politics? How much damage will be done meanwhile: to the environment, to workers, to a generation of children who will grow up in deprivation, to the nation’s civic fabric?
A second—and more troubling—concern goes to the questionable validity of the demographic thesis itself. We see no guarantee that the nation’s forecast demographic shift (toward new generations, and away from the present majority of citizens of European descent) will bring about the political and social adjustments that many Americans long for. It is true that younger whites appear to be, on balance, more “liberal” (more on this term later) than their parents, but who is to say that, as in previous generations, they will not become more conservative as they age? How can we be sure, given what we have seen lately, that they will not turn in significant numbers to new alignments, libertarianism or xenophobic nationalism, vaguely articulated Marxist-Leninism or nihilistic anarchism? They may simply turn away from political involvement altogether—a trend already underway.
As for citizens of other than European descent, we have no guarantee that they will cast their votes with Democrats, either. Among other shocking elements of the 2016 election were exit polls showing Trump receiving as much as 29% of Latino votes in some jurisdictions, a percentage equal to the billionaire’s support among those who identify as Asian-American. And this was for a candidate openly hostile to further immigration from Latin America: in the 2010 midterm elections for Congress, with immigration less a hot-button issue, a full 38% of Latino voters voted Republican. Consider further: perhaps the most reactionary member of the current Supreme Court, Clarence Thomas, is an African-American. In short, it does not appear that ethnicity is a reliable indicator of political affiliation. Nor should it be. To assume that all people who share the same ethnic heritage will vote identically turns people into stereotypes: exactly the kind of thinking that should be avoided by those who stand for the proposition that all should be respected as individuals. Finally, are any of us really comfortable banking our hopes on citizens of non-European descent (people “of color”) aligning against citizens of European descent: a nation divided into ethnic enclaves (and skin shades), the sole political dividing line being one’s tribal identity? Do we want to become the Balkans of the 1990s? 1970s Ireland? Rwanda? This is a vision, clearly, that we should all turn from in horror. It is the same terrain being covered by the Steve Bannons of this world, the Marine Le Pens, with the protagonists and antagonists interchanged. The same can be said about counting on the young to vote against the old, or women to vote against men. To invert Hillary Clinton’s campaign slogan, divisions will not make us stronger.
Attachment to the demography thesis of ultimate Democratic triumph is, I fear, more a product of intellectual laziness, wishful thinking and a lack of stomach to confront the philosophical chaos of modern “liberalism” than a sound prediction of America’s future. The Democratic Party has largely gained the image of a catch-all organization, a clearing house for the grievances of specific identity groups against the wider system. The Democratic Party should never relinquish its historic role as the champion of any person or group of persons who receives unequal treatment or who is systematically marginalized from full participation in American society. The rectifying of specific grievances, however, is not a political program capable of leading a nation. What the Democratic Party lacks is a clear vision of the kind of society it wishes the United States to be, with a set of government programs resting on a rigorously defined theory of the mechanisms under which access to economic goods, social integration and political participation should be achieved. Happily, the framework for such a vision, such a set of programs and such a theoretical basis already exists: together they are called social democracy. Not only is this model already extant, with decades of practical experience in the field of European politics, it has long been part—albeit a submerged and poorly articulated part—of our own Democratic Party’s identity.
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What then is social democracy? Broadly speaking, social democracy is a philosophy of social-political organization in which private enterprise is the chief engine of economic production but in which government does not hesitate to intervene to assure that monopolies of wealth do not run roughshod over the rights of ordinary citizens, that no one is excluded from economic, social or cultural participation and that all citizens are accorded certain basic necessities. Social democracy, in its European birthplace, has especially focused on jobs for all at decent wages, the right of workers to participate in decisions affecting their well-being, and a social safety net that protects citizens against such “social risks” as unemployment, old age or poor health.
Put differently, we might say that social democracy is democracy with an emphasis on the fact that we are social beings—and that to a fair extent we rise or fall together. The social democracy outlook runs counter to the philosophy, dear to the right wing, which sees us each as separate atoms, fighting all against all to gain power and wealth, with the government playing no more role than that of a referee.
Social democracy, it must be emphasized, is not socialism. Socialism, according to Merriam Webster, refers to “any of various economic and political theories advocating collective or governmental ownership and administration of the means of production and distribution of goods.” That is to say that, properly speaking, “socialism” is the sort of arrangement that existed in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, there is a great deal of confusion about the term: a confusion which stems from several sources. The American right, to name one such source, has long used “socialism” as a slur against any social democratic program it dislikes. In Europe, meanwhile, many social democratic parties, which historically emerged from truly socialist parties, still go under the name “Socialist” though they long ago abandoned a socialist agenda.
More topically, in our recent presidential election Bernie Sanders famously admitted that he was a “socialist”: it is unlikely, however, that he meant to convey that he favors a command-and-control economy for the United States. (The fact that Sanders has clarified elsewhere that he is a “democratic socialist” does not change the equation: a “democratic socialist” is merely one who believes, like any proper socialist, that the “means of production” should be in the hands of the state, but that such a system should be installed and maintained through democratic means, rather than through the kind of dictatorships that ruled the Soviet Union and still rule China, Cuba and North Korea.)
All this confusion of terms does no one any good. The Social Democrat will maintain a clear distinction based on dictionary definitions: “socialism” is a belief in state ownership and control of economic production; “social democracy” is a political philosophy encompassing a chiefly private enterprise economy, along with a democratic government unapologetically committed to using its power to protect and advance the welfare of all citizens.
Social democracy first emerged in the period after the First World War, when socialists in several European countries, disenchanted both with ongoing brutalities in the Soviet Union and the failure of a Marxist-Leninist program to gain voting blocs sufficient to play a meaningful role in parliaments, defected to form new parties. These “social democratic” parties abandoned the Marxist-Leninist call for a violent overthrow of the existing order and a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” advocating instead for amelioration of the harsher aspects of laissez-faire capitalism, under representative democracies, through protections for workers and social safety net programs
Armed with this less radical program, social democratic parties in Germany, France, the Low Countries, England and Scandinavia soon found themselves sharing power in or, especially after the Second World War, directing national governments. Ever since, social democratic parties have been the dominant players in Western European governments.
Socialist parties were weak in early 20th Century America, as compared to Europe, and it was not until the Great Depression that laissez-faire doctrines were seriously challenged here. Under the strain of that crisis, FDR (claiming, famously, that he was acting to save capitalism) spearheaded the erection of the initial pillars of social democracy in the United States: the National Labor Relations Act (guaranteeing collective bargaining rights); Social Security; national unemployment insurance; a national minimum wage; and Aid for Families with Dependant Children (welfare). Also important, though temporary, were active labor market programs like the Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps, which put the unemployed back to work. Though public health insurance was a chief priority for FDR’s successor, Harry Truman, he failed to convince a Republican Congress; it was not until the presidency of Lyndon Baynes Johnson that social democracy received another major boost in the form of Medicare and Medicaid.
Throughout the remainder of the 1960s and into the 70s, American social democracy benefitted from such enhancements to the social safety net as food stamps and expanded housing vouchers, as well as one major new pillar—the Earned Income Tax Credit, which lifts many working families out of poverty. The next major breakthrough occurred with President Obama’s Affordable Care Act, now targeted for dismantlement by Republicans in Congress.
Based on the foregoing, it should be clear that social democracy, or at least many elements of it, already exists in the United States. But whether the United States should be considered a social democratic nation is a question about which experts differ. German economist Klaus Zimmermann smartly analyzed the issue in a New York Times editorial in which he concluded that the United States is best seen as an “un(der)funded” social democracy. By this he meant both that our commitment to social democratic policies is weak and (perhaps, therefore) that we are reluctant to adequately fund them.
Klaus’s analysis is cogent. Compared to fully developed social democracies in Europe, the United States is an outlier. We alone among OECD countries lack universal health care, for example. Our support for the unemployed is meager compared to most European nations and our support for organized labor is laughable in light of, for example, Germany’s worker councils. Most of our social safety net programs—housing, support for children and families, training programs—are funded at levels which guarantee that not all eligible citizens will be served.
Much of this is a result of something Klauss does not address in his article: deep partisan divisions within the American body politic. Most Democrats are committed to social democracy and are willing to fund it; Republicans and their close political relatives, such as libertarians, despise social democracy as an assault upon their cherished laissez-faire ideology. The ongoing strength of this right-wing opposition, from FDR forward, has hindered social democratic progress in the United States. As such, the United States is best seen as an organism with social democratic tendencies that are struggling for full development. The nation has established a number of social democratic programs but, on the whole, it does not have the “feel” of the mature social democracies of Europe.
Aside from our often meager safety net provisions, we lack a vocabulary of social democracy. A key term heard in European politics, for example, is solidarity. Social solidarity—that all should be included, that all should feel a part—is central to the social democratic way of life and informs each and every policy position taken by social democratic governments. A commitment to solidarity is seen, for example, in France’s retirement laws, which allow those who work in difficult manual occupations to retire earlier than office workers, or in the school allowances given to families so that all children will have the school supplies they need to fully participate. When former French Prime Minister Manuel Valls, announcing his candidacy for the French presidency last December, stated that he was running in order to protect France’s “social model” from right wing incursions, the French people knew to what he was referring: their social democratic polity.
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A major problem facing social democracy in the U.S. is a lack of focus within the political block which should be its natural home, the Democratic Party. We won’t go into the tortuous history of the Party from its 19th century roots in states-rights-ism, slavocracy and Jim Crow, through populism and the championing of down and out farmers and laborers, other than to say that the Party’s disparate roots do not lend themselves to a clear philosophy of government. Since FDR the Party has largely been associated with social democratic principles, but its reliance on Southern Democrats up through the Civil Rights era, and Johnson’s blunder in Vietnam, further muddied the ideological waters. Jimmy Carter’s presidency foundered on stagflation, leading to government by a resurgent and highly organized right wing, the obstructionism of which both subsequent Democratic presidents, Clinton and Obama, have had to deal with in Congress.
Given its history, it is not surprising that the Democratic Party has failed to articulate a rigorous philosophy of social-economic organization. Not explicitly codifying its role as the bearer of social democracy in America, the Party fails to telegraph its core identity to the American public. Is it the party of citizens of African ancestry who argue that police killings occur disproportionately against members of their ethnic group, or the party of women who complain of unequal pay? Is it the party of the transgender teen who feels uncomfortable in the bathroom of her birth gender, or the party of the undocumented immigrant who wants amnesty and a path to citizenship? The Democratic Party is, of course, the party of these and many other separate issues (and constituencies). But what we argue here is that the Party, while naturally taking a stand on such hot topics of the day, must constantly remind the voting public of its abiding philosophy of governing—and be prepared to vigorously act upon it. We argue further that that abiding philosophy is, and should remain, social democracy.
In the core of her Convention speech Hillary Clinton laid out a program that would make any social democrat proud. It included the following: a living wage; universal healthcare; historic-level public infrastructure investments to create jobs, foster innovation and assure a sustainable energy future; vocational training programs for non-college-bound students; free college tuition for all but the wealthy, with debt-free college for all; easier credit for small business entrepreneurs; affordable child care and family leave; an end to subsidies for outsourcing firms; higher taxes on the wealthy; and gun control measures to protect public safety. Unfortunately, a program so clearly designed to improve the lives of average Americans failed to convince tens of millions of them to give Clinton their vote. Why?
A large part of the explanation lies in media sensationalism (as well as complacency on the part of the public which the media serves). Voters have become so attuned to hot-button issues that completely dominate the nightly news that when a politician announces a sober-minded, practical and vitally important program to govern the nation in the interest of average workers, it is simply tuned out. It does not register. Intelligent discourse is lost in the noise not only of random acts of disturbing violence, but also snarky repartee, identity-affirming sloganeering and “gotcha” moments so dear to the purveyors of “news as entertainment.”
If serious champions of average Americans, like Hillary Clinton, are to combat this phenomenon, they must tirelessly repeat their pragmatic solutions to the American public and avoid allowing the public’s (and their) attention to become absorbed by whatever attention-grabbing controversy the 24-hour news cycle wishes to push to the fore during a given week or election cycle.
Clinton faced another major challenge in 2016, of course: that of the Sanders wing of young “radicals.” We are now paying a catastrophic price for an internecine battle that was far uglier than it should have been. The Clinton and Sanders programs were not that far apart. To make sure that a 2008-style great recession does not recur, Clinton wanted to regulate financial institutions more carefully, à la Dodd-Frank; Sanders wants to break up the big banks. Clinton wanted to make college free for all students of moderate means; Sanders wanted to include children of high-income parents. Clinton supported the TPP process during the treaty’s negotiation, but after its provisions were finalized opposed it; Sanders opposed it all along. It is difficult to ascertain here anything rising to an existential difference between two philosophies of governing. Perhaps in Clinton’s earlier support of the disastrous Iraq invasion (and Sander’s opposition) we arrive at a more important divergence, given the misery that blunder has caused. Yet this was in 2003, and there was little sense in 2016 that Clinton was interested in bringing the U.S. into a ground war in the Middle East.
Support for Sanders relied to a great extent on a matter of tone. In branding himself a “socialist,” however ambiguosly, and in his combative attitude toward business, Sanders appeals especially to that significant portion of young Americans who now hold a negative view of “capitalism.” (To lean on Merriam Webster again: “capitalism: an economic system characterized by private or corporate ownership of capital goods, by investments that are determined by private decision, and by prices, production, and the distribution of goods that are determined mainly by competition in a free market.”) As one would expect, this same age cohort also holds a favorable view of “socialism,” though studies find little agreement among them about what the term means; surprisingly, survey respondents simultaneously hold a favorable view “socialism” and dislike too much government intervention in the economy!).
Our Revolution, the title of Sanders’ November, 2016 book, as well as the political movement his campaign spawned, suggests a total—and violent—upheaval of the existing order. More Merriam Webster: revolution: "a fundamental change in political organization; esp : the overthrow of one government or ruler and the substitution of another by the governed.” (Note: not the substitution of one party by another, but the substitution of one government by another.) Although Sanders has stated clearly that he is a democratic socialist, there is that whiff of violence about his rhetoric (and labeling) and that of his supporters, suggesting the elimination of disdained private enterprise in the United States through some sudden overthrow of the government. (The lauding in the Sanders wing of groups like “Occupy,” which specifically rejected the rule of law in favor of illegal mob action, and whose leadership was shot through with anarchists, lends credence to the impression.)
Here, as elsewhere, an understanding—and appreciation—of “social democracy” matters. As we have pointed out, “socialism” traditionally indicates state ownership and exercise of the means of production—the ex-U.S.S.R., in other words. If you don’t want a government-run economy, your other choice is some form of “capitalism.” It could be that Sanders and his supporters would like to encourage something like Jeremy Corbyn’s cooperative ownership (though this would still seem to leave the “means of production” in private hands, just different ones). If the "radicals" are trying to create a new definition of "socialism," communication would be greatly aided if someone would explicitly state what it is.
In short, it would be helpful for Sanders and his supporters to be more forthright about what they are advocating and stop with the thrilling innuendo. If they don’t want “capitalism,” they could clearly lay out what alternative they are recommending. If their definition of socialism does not imply a command-and-control economy, what is it?” As John Lennon famously sang, we’d all love to see the plan. Here we are talking about an existential difference between two mutually incompatible methods of socio-economic organization: more intellectual clarity is critically needed.
It could be that the Sanders camp is simply advocating for social democracy, but doing so with a greater degree of impatience and more violent rhetoric than, say, Chuck Schumer and Hillary Clinton. And, in fact, studies have shown little difference among Clinton and Sanders voters on specific issues. Sanders’ ambiguity only encourages theoretical confusion among his supporters who, like him, call themselves “socialists” without sharing any consensus, among themselves or with the wider world (or Merriam Websters) regarding what the word means.
If Sanders is in truth a social democrat, believing in a chiefly private enterprise – based economy, closely regulated by the state, he should explain to his supporters that for a social democrat “capitalism” (allowing private citizens to own and exercise the means of production) is considered a critical component of a successful society. Entrepreneurs (28 million people in the U.S.) who start and run smaller businesses, as well as those who own and manage major corporations, are the people who organize the building of our houses and cars (and produce the materials they are built with); the construction of roads and bridges, the production of our computers and digital devices; the growing of our food; the production of the music and television programs we love (or love to hate); the provison of home aides to aging relatives; ad infinitum.
If Sanders believes that all of this could be accomplished more effectively under some sort of “socialist” system, he should devote an appropriate amount of time and energy to explaining what alternative he has in mind and making a case for it—a case that has generally been difficult to make, given the abject performance of socialist economies in those nations that have tried it (cut to food riots in Venezuela). By straightening out the matter of his political philosophy, Sanders could (option 1) more effectively work with other social democrats, while also helping to bring his supporters solidly into the social democratic movement, or (2) give voters a clear option of a truly “socialist” agenda. It would seem to be incumbent upon Sanders, who has created this confusion, to dispel it.
During the election cycle many in the Sanders group, with some assistance from the candidate himself, painted Clinton as a corporate shill and enemy of the common citizen. Everything we know about Clinton’s history—as well as her precisely articulated program for governing—reveals this as a crude and false caricature. Nonetheless it was widely accepted and articulated by Sanders’ supporters. We are unaware of dispositive figures regarding whether the withholding of votes from Clinton in the general election, or whether votes from disaffected Sanders’ supporters for third party candidates, cost Clinton the election. It would seem self-evident, in any case, that all of the negative energy propagated in her direction did not help her candidacy. In an alternate universe, with both Sanders and Clinton as self-identified “social democrats,” differences would likely have been handled in a more collegial way.
Last year, while discussing the heated controversy over accepting one million Syrian refugees into her nation, German Chancellor Angela Merkel acknowledged high feelings about the issue but said that within her ruling block they would discuss the options calmly, “because we are democrats.” Perhaps given German’s tragic 20th Century history, its people are more aware of the dangers that come with overheated rhetoric—and the necessity, for a healthy democracy, of listening to one another through rational deliberation of issues at hand. We Americans can learn something there.
A final problem for Clinton in 2016 was globalization. Not just in the U.S., but across the developed world political actors have been caught flat-footed on the issue—witness Brexit or the Marine Le Pen nationalist surge in France’s recent presidential election. As Peter Goodman wrote recently in the New York Times: “the debates that we are having about globalization and the adjustment cost . . . we should have been having when we did Nafta, and when China entered the W.T.O.”
Well, we didn’t have them, nor were programs put in place to shield workers whose lives have been disrupted. Clinton faced two candidates—Sanders in the primaries and Trump in the general election—who managed to end-run her on trade, promising relief through protectionism. We even witnessed the bizarre spectacle of union officials throwing in their lot with a union-busting, Republican Trump, because (1) he promised protectionist support for the industries they represent and because (2) they actually believed he would follow through (we’ll see). To trade or not, and under what terms, has rightly become a salient issue in our political discourse—and one with no simple answers. Here as elsewhere, the social democratic left should engage in open and collegial discussion about which policies will best serve ordinary citizens and workers, rather than break into bitterly opposed factions based on superficial readings of the data.
The rift within the American left revealed by the 2016 Clinton-Sanders slugfest has transmogrified into a battle for the “soul” of the Democratic Party—a rift which has occasioned much huddling of Party officials and much ink-spilling on op-ed pages. Again, nuances of tone and feeling can be as important, or more so, than actual issues. In California the state party faced chaos at its recent convention, when a group convened by the California Nurses Association disrupted the proceedings with endless chants of “Single-Payer,” “Single-Payer,” as if support for single-payer (which incidentally, happens to be The Social Democrat’s position) were the sole litmus test separating the acceptable from the irredeemable.
One camp argues that the Party needs to go “bolder” in order to convince a governing majority of Americans, or that the Dems can win without reaching beyond their committed base of educated urbanites, African Americans and advocates for immigrants. A second camp argues for toning down controversial issues like abortion and transgender bathroom bills and focusing on the kind of worker-support issues (like higher wages, better jobs) and broad-based safety net programs that appeal to a wider swath of Americans—including many who supported Trump last year. Let us again appeal to Ms. Merkel and discuss the issues calmly. Clinton’s proposals, as outlined above, were plenty bold by almost any measure, reflecting unprecedented government intervention in the economy and major new departures: an extensive public works program; living-wage legislation; free college for many and debt-free college for all, 500 million installed solar panels. Nor did Clinton fail to carry the Democratic Party’s legacy of championing equal rights for all American citizens, regardless of ancestry, gender or sexual orientation: her call to breaking down barriers to inclusion was emphatic and tireless.
Those arguing for “going bolder” are failing to articulate what that would mean, if it doesn’t mean positions exactly such as those advocated in the Clinton campaign. If it were to come down to “single-payer” versus “improved ACA,” we might say that reasonable people might differ as to the best way to go at present, given the realities of political maneuvering. The left should not tear itself apart over means when we share the same ends.
The Democratic Party’s confusion over its identity is all the more damaging in that its opponents on the right have spent the past forty years honing theirs. Their philosophy of limited government and untrammeled capitalism has remained constant over decades and bears the advantage of being easy both to articulate and to understand. Their free-market philosophy’s chief demerit—that in its many over-simplifications it avoids huge swaths of reality—is, in a nation where most of the electorate is both uninformed and unwilling to focus attention on matters of social policy, a major tactical benefit. What the Democratic Party needs is an equally clear statement of basic principles, and programs that go with them, that (1) stems from core commitments about fair access to economic, social and political participation, and (2) appeals to a winning (electoral) majority of American voters.
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The Democratic Party could, of course, follow the counsel of those who preach ultimate triumph through changing demography, discussed above. It could double down on identity politics, positioning itself as the party of “people of color” against those of European extraction (they have a color, too); for the reasons, both practical and moral, outlined above, I sincerely hope the Party rejects this choice. This does not mean that the Party would abandon marginalized ethnic or sexual minorities to their separate fates, or that it would cease the ongoing struggle to integrate women more fully into our nation’s economic life. It would rather include these issues under an overarching rubric of social democrat policies, founded in social solidarity, that stands a chance of appealing to a working electoral majority of all Americans.
Focus on an all-embracing social democratic program holds the yet greater promise of softening, rather than accentuating, differences of gender, ethnicity and sexual identity, of healing our society rather than further polarizing it. When minimum wages are raised to a living wage level, every worker benefits; when health care is a social right, we all recognize our obligations toward one another; when community police review boards are established and strategies implemented to reduce police violence, every citizen who encounters the police, of any background, is safer; when robust programs are put in place to guide non-college-bound teens into secure livelihoods, every young person, straight or gay, male or female, of any shade of skin, stands a better chance to fully develop her or his potential and to fully participate in our national life. This strategy—maintaining the Party’s role as a champion of the marginalized while also presenting a broad-based economic and social agenda—has been dubbed the new “fusion” politics in some quarters. There seems no other intelligent way forward.
If we look at the two major political parties and their relation to the social democratic program in the United States, the picture is relatively clear. Democrats struggle both to preserve existing elements of social democracy and to expand them, while the GOP exerts all its force to block any further expansion of social democracy and, where possible, to roll back existing social democratic elements.
When we look at the electorate, as opposed to the major parties, however, the picture is more complicated. Trump gained the presidency with a mix of cultural conservatism, nationalism and economic populism, while promising both to preserve Social Security and Medicare and to insure that any Obamacare replacement would include universal coverage. He was able to outflank Clinton on the global trade front with crocodile tears for workers whom he believes do not deserve healthcare, living wages or unions. Putting aside Trump’s mendacity (he has supported the Republicans’ ACA revisions, for example, which make no pretense to universal coverage), the 2016 election made it clear that political fault lines in America cannot be easily described in terms of “for” or “against” social democratic programs. Many Trump supporters depend heavily on Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps and other social democratic initiatives, and many of these voters have expressed discontent at the Republican healthcare law.
Tribal identity, however, and unease with the pace of culture change demanded by the Democratic Party’s urban elites, provides a base of goodwill for right-wing politicians; allied to Trump’s hollow promise of good jobs for everyone, and his lip service to popular social democratic programs, this identity-playing has enabled the right to retain at least a temporary hold on the culturally conservative, yet economically stressed low-education segment of the white electorate. It is almost a certainty that Trump and the current Congress’s supply-side economic doctrine will do nothing to materially aid this constituency. We will see how they respond in 2018 and 2020.
Much will depend on what the Democratic Party has to offer instead. If the Party doubles down on tribal politics (us versus them) it will continue to force people to choose sides based on their percieved ethnic and regional identities—contrary to social democracy’s commitments to solidarity and inclusion. If it pushes the most radical versions of culture change issues to the top of its agenda, it will continue to drive away not only the poorly educated, lower-income whites whom some want to dismiss as irrelevant, but also many others—more culturally moderate voters of all ethnic identities.
Two examples: the Party might continue to educate the public about transgenderism and advocate for bathroom access, while leaving the much more highly contentious issue of group shower rooms open for further discussion; or, the Party might be content with defending Roe v Wade’s protections through the second trimester, given the widespread opposition among the American public—including women—toward late-term abortions.
Finally, if the Party tears itself apart over vaguely defined differences of “more radical” or “less radical,” rather than engaging in the serious thought and discussion needed to develop programs that insure economic, social and political inclusion for all Americans, it will perpetuate the vacuum on the left which has been eagerly filled in Congress, in the Executive Branch and now the Supreme Court—and in governors mansions and state houses around the country—by unapologetic free marketeers and right-wing ideologues. (As far as those who despise private enterprise and wish to establish a state-run economy, they should be politely invited to join the Socialist Party of America, where they can forthrightly advance their agenda along with like-minded individuals. The resulting discussion would be healthy for the nation.)
A more sound alternative, however, than any of the forgoing would be for the Democratic Party to remind itself that it is the bearer of social democracy in America, the quintessential political philosophy of modern times, and position itself to the electorate chiefly as the party which will explain, extol, protect and expand our “social model” for all Americans.
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What would that mean in practice? Let’s first look at protecting social democracy in America: what are the existing pillars of the social democratic project at the national level in the United States? We mentioned several of these earlier, but I will list the salient ones here, so that we have a more complete picture.
* Unions’ right to organize (Labor Relations Act)
* Income Support ( federal minimum wage, Earned Income Tax Credit)
* 40-hour work week (or lower!)
* Medicaid
* Social Security
* Medicare
* Environmental Protection (EPA)
* Health and Safety Standards for Workers (OSHA)
* Consumer Protection (FCC, USDA, FDA)
* Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (welfare)
* Unemployment Insurance
* Aid to Education (Head Start, etc.)
* Housing Assistance (public housing, voucher programs)
* Democracy (voting fairness, voting rights, campaign finance regulation)
* Food Security (food stamps, school nutrition programs)
* Job Placement and Training (US Employment Service, Job Corps)
* Regulation of Financial Industry (Dodd-Frank Act)
Each of these social democratic programs are now under serious assault by Trump and Republican majorities in Congress, the Supreme Court, and most state governments. It is clear that the prime directive of a Democratic Party that owns its role as the bearer of social democracy in America must involve doing everything within its power to protect these gains, hard won over the course of generations, from the alt-right counter revolution—while setting its sights on changing the electoral equation before the 2018 mid-term elections and after.
The Democratic Party can best do this, in the opinion of The Social Democrat, by more explicitly establishing its identity as America’s social democratic party. (A name change—to the Social Democratic Party of America—would not perhaps be inapt.) Democratic politicians and activists must constantly remind the public that the Democratic Party is the party responsible for minimum wages, the 40-hour work week, the right of workers to organize, civil rights legislation, protection of the environment and public spaces, safe working conditions, the safety of food and medicines, Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, housing programs, support for children whose low income status would otherwise doom them to irremediable marginalization, and much more.
Taking on the mantle of defender of our “social model,” they must explain to the electorate how these major programs are under coordinated attack by Republicans. The Democratic Party’s identity as the champion of all to be treated equally, regardless of gender, ethnic background or sexual orientation should continue to form a key part of the Party’s identity: it goes to the crucial social democratic values of solidarity and inclusion. But in the current political environment especially, when a reactionary regime in Washington (and a large majority of states) is making the most determined assault on the pillars of social democracy in America yet seen, the Democratic Party must also exert itself to remind voters that it is the nation’s only bulwark against opponents determined to wipe out three generations of practical gains for all American citizens. With this “fusion” approach, the Party stands a chance to broaden its appeal to the large center of American voters and achieve a lasting—perhaps permanent—dominance in U.S. politics.
A renewed focus on defending the pillars of social democracy may go some way toward winning back heartland and Rust Belt voters who fell victim to Trump’s line, especially those who voted Obama in 2008 and 2016. But to really inspire the American electorate, Democrats must go beyond defending the current level of social democracy in America to expanding it.
A truly social democratic party, while not necessarily taking a protectionist stance, will promise more support—through active labor market policies and more comprehensive unemployment assistance—for workers whose lives are disrupted by either technological change or global competition. Minimum wages (or a combination of minimum wages and the Earned Income Tax Credit) should be adequate to make a reasonable living. If private enterprise is not producing enough jobs for all, those without jobs should receive income support, ongoing training, and/or jobs through the government as an employer of last resort.
All children should have affordable access to quality pre-school and a solid public education, through college for those who are capable. Everyone should have affordable healthcare under a single payer system. Working women should receive the childcare and other support they need to fully participate in the nation’s economic life.
If Democrats have felt that they cannot afford to trend too populist on these issues, the popularity of Trump’s message suggests that heartland voters are more susceptible to policies that insure a decent standard of living for all who are willing to work, and social safety net programs for the sick, the unemployed and the old, than previously thought.
We have reached a juncture in this country where Americans who believe in social democracy must become more articulate about their political philosophy: so that we can protect existing social democratic programs; so that we can work to turn the United States into a truly mature social democracy; and so that we have the proper vocabulary around which to rally supporters as well as convince skeptics.
We must work to create a political environment in which an American politician might say that she is fighting to “preserve our social model,” and we will all know what she is talking about. Social democracy is currently embattled even in its European heartland by cross currents of nationalist populism and culture wars, just as it is in the United States. We must not allow these distractions to create an opening for the laissez-faire right to dismantle what social democracy we have, while we are all looking elsewhere, drawn by the attention-deficit media to the tweet of the day.
From the struggle between laissez-faire capitalism and totalitarian Marxist-Leninism that animated politics during the early years of the 20th century, social democracy emerged as the inevitable synthesis: it recognizes both the benefits of dynamic markets extolled by the right, as well as the human imperative of social solidarity which forms the emotional and philosophical core of socialism. It is The Social Democrat’s view that a better concept for political and social organization is unlikely to emerge in the conceivable future; the philosophy’s success in Europe attests to its viability.
The fact that social democracy has not yet matured in the United States is a reflection of aspects of American exceptionalism (abundant untapped resources, a once-open frontier, a clear field to economic dominance in the wake of World War II, with all competitors flattened by war losses) that are quickly becoming irrelevant, as Klaus Zimmermann explains in the excellent article mentioned above. The United States is both a political and a cultural heir of Europe; it is time we join the mainstream of Western Civilization and advance to true social democratic status.
A final word about words. It is The Social Democrat’s view that the American left’s philosophic incoherence (as well as its problems at the ballot box) stems in large part from an inadequate vocabulary. We have both “liberals” and “progressives,” but what exactly do such terms mean? Are they the same thing? Isn’t everyone for progress? (Even Republicans in Congress say they are for it: for them, gutting social programs is “progress.”)
Such amorphous terms make it difficult to distinguish political allies from opponents. Some on the left, referring to themselves as “progressives,” are true socialists: yes, they believe in Marxist-Leninism and despise both private enterprise and democracy; others are anarchists. In brief, the terms liberal and progressive are too vague to build a successful political program around, with the term liberal bearing the additional liability of being a technical term in political science for free market regimes: not the way the average American uses the word. As for true socialists and anarchists, their ideas lack any record of successful implementation and in any case bear no chance of convincing more than a miniscule portion of the American electorate—indeed scare off the vast majority of it.
A political movement needs adequate branding if it is to be successful, and the proper branding for the great bulk of the American left is “social democracy.” Merely labeling ourselves “social democrats” will not, of course, dispel all ideological fluidity. Social democracy is a large tent, leaving plenty of latitude as to the types and degree of government involvement needed to best achieve our goals of a prosperous but also inclusive and solidaristic society: from Hillary Clinton to Bernie Sanders and beyond. (Limited state ownership of some vital functions and forms of property, for example, or state shares in private enterprises, would not fall outside the province of social democratic action.)
Social democracy will always be a work in progress, with its only consistent thread being its basic values: representative democracy; a belief in private enterprise as the chief engine for economic creativity and production; an equal belief that it is not only the right but the obligation of the state to regulate that economy for the benefit of all citizens; and a belief that all citizens must be assured such basic necessities as medical care, food and shelter—in short, a conviction that it is the proper and necessary job of governments to assure that every mother’s daughter and son be afforded an effective opportunity to participate in society’s economic, social and political life
With social democracy’s long and successful history in Europe, we have many concrete examples of what social democracy, more fully implemented (and more openly embraced) looks like. We should adopt the term unreservedly, align ourselves with our fellow social democrats in Europe and other OECD countries, look at best practices across the entire family of social democratic nations and work to implement them here. In doing so we join in the work-in-progress of perfecting the social democratic society. It will be the purpose of this website to serve as a clearing house for information, news and commentary most pertinent to the social democratic philosophy, with the hope that in some small measure we might advance the social democratic project in America.
W. E. Smith
